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**The International Dimension
of Culture and Conflict**

Proceedings of the Symposium

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The International Dimension of Culture and Conflict

Proceedings of the Symposium


Bozeman

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The International Dimension of Culture and Conflict

Proceedings of the Symposium

The Political-Military Affairs Division
Airpower Research Institute
with the participation

of

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PREFACE

This CADRE Paper contains the edited transcript of The International Dimension of Culture and Conflict Symposium held at Air University on 20 April 1990. This symposium was undertaken to honor the work of Adda B. Bozeman, whose eloquence and clarity of thought have illuminated the influence of culture on the causes, nature, and conduct of war. Today we hope to do more than simply express our homage to Professor Bozeman. We intend to show that years after the completion of her pioneering work* her ideas are still not only fresh, they are fully relevant to the unsettled times in which we are now obliged to live and which demand of us a reshaping of our philosophical, political, and military values.

The West has taken as a symbol of these frightening times the disintegration of Leninist values in Eastern Europe and its profound effect on the course of superpower relations. The center of our political and military preoccupations has been irrevocably shaken. But the precipitous unfolding of European events and the subsequent easing of East-West tensions have overshadowed, in the felicitous phrase of the Rumanian philosopher Emil Cioran, an increasing volatility in the "suburbs of the globe."

The attention of the military services understandably has been fixed on the need to reassess the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in light of these conditions. Yet what of Iraq's use of chemical weapons, the legacy of the late Ayatollah Khomeini's savage brutality, the *intifadah*, the disintegration of Lebanon, the retrenchment of the Vietnamese in Southeast Asia, the extrication of Soviet and Cuban forces from Africa, the release of Nelson Mandela, the systematic dismantling of the South African apartheid system, and the surprising political changes in Nicaragua? These events tell us that conflict still prevails on the world's periphery and may intensify; but, more important, that the nature of warfare, its causes, its conduct, and its conventional and unconventional tactics, strategy, and weaponry have fundamentally altered. As we address our security interests in the framework of a new global perspective, we will be required to comprehend the cultural imperatives that drive the actions of a new generation of leaders who are now ready to challenge world peace.

For certain their self-contained universe of values is not ours. Although these new praetorians have dotted their societies with modern political institutions, their loyalty to nation or state, as we understand such concepts in the West, does not transcend the more elemental belief systems that inhere in shared religious precepts, ethnicity, language, and common cultural history and expression. Adda Bozeman has been in the vanguard of those academics who recognized the incredible force such traditional forms of identification can exercise on the international order. In her book, *Politics and Culture in International Relations*, Professor Bozeman set out the philosophical basis for the role of culture in the domain of politics. In her 1976 *Orbis* article, "War and the Clash of Ideas," she extended her analysis to the realm of conflict studies.

*"War and the Clash of Ideas," *Orbis* 20, no. 1 (Spring 1976): 61-103.

Everywhere we look in the third world today we observe in the concepts of nationality, international law, human rights, sovereignty, and the nation-state, the distorted shapes of values reflecting regional cultures. Adda Bozeman's work has schooled us in this tragic history. As we focus today on the analysis of conflict in the context of the vast cultural differences that inform these regional developments, we take a page from her book.

Professor Bozeman's theses are certainly provocative. She challenges the liberal view that peace is natural to mankind and that war is the aberration, a psychological and ethical short-circuiting of our basic instincts for irenic human relationships. These views have stimulated our research, and we believe that Professor Bozeman would be disappointed if her ideas were not controversial.

Yet, more than their conceptual controversy and the influence on our work, Adda Bozeman's ideas have helped us deal with the frustration of no longer having a standard explanation of international relations with which to understand the last three decades of turbulent world history and to fulfill, therefore, our obligation to educate the military establishment in the changing nature of warfare. In retrospect, we feel sure that if decision makers had applied her analytic insights to foreign policy, American participation in contemporary conflicts might have been greatly modified.

We have taken Professor Bozeman's analysis as our point of departure and have constructed our research around the cogency of her theses to a concept of culture in the greatly differing areas of our world. For the foreseeable future, the third world is where war will happen as a daily fact of life for millions of people. Hence, we anticipate an increase in the demand for the regional perspective.

This symposium is a contribution to a series of divisional studies in the area of low-intensity conflict. The papers in these proceedings are presented in the order in which they were given, and our omission of footnotes reflects the forum in which they were given. In presenting these short papers to you, we are not bound by a single program or disciplinary approach. We are bound, however, to the restrictions of a CADRE Paper and, therefore, have omitted the 32-page *Orbis* article on which each paper is based.

We are about to present to you the core of a collection of essays to be published—along with the *Orbis* article—at a later date by the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education. We would like to recognize Professor Bozeman for the inspiration her participation has given to our enterprise, and we hope that the Air Force will put our work to proper use.

The Political-Military Affairs Division wishes to thank Ms Bessie Varner and Lt Col Richard Davis for the indispensable aid they rendered in making this symposium and publication a success.



Dr Lewis B. Ware
Director, International Dimension of
Culture and Conflict Symposium

Class War on the International Scale

The Culture of Political Conflict from Lenin to Gorbachev

Dr Stephen J. Blank

TODAY'S international order is undergoing a radical transformation. Any such transformation in the world's order issues from and engenders profound transformations in the component parts of the system and in particular the so-called nation-state of Western classical diplomatic history. In both Europe and the third world, new and old nations and communities are either coming together, splitting apart, or demanding a breakup of larger units of which they formed a part. Examples are the reunification of Germany; the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Lebanon; and ethnic unrest in Israel, the USSR, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Other cases can easily be listed.

These revolutionary movements and trends constitute a standing challenge to the policies of a liberal world political order and to the American-led effort to construct a system whose point of departure is Wilsonian liberalism or some variant thereof. The magnitude of the crises shaking these states suggests that in the nineties the crisis of governability of many third-world states—one thinks of Yugoslavia, the USSR, and the disintegration in Lebanon—will be so great as to cause the disappearance of some of these as functioning nation-states.

Be that as it may, the foregoing observations highlight a cardinal point of Professor Bozeman's work: that is, the enduring and profound challenge to the existence of the nation-state—the classi-

cal avatar of Western political theories—from various revolutionary theorists and practitioners of international politics. One of the primary axes of their challenge has been an effort to overcome, diminish, transcend, or break up the existing order to make room for new formations, whatever their source. In most, if not all, cases these revolutionaries have been inspired by Leninist and Soviet practices of political conflict.

However one labels it, there can be no doubt that the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 institutionalized a schism in the world that World War I had already created and perpetuated it in the form of an ideological as well as political war against liberalism. Since then, this global schism has been expanded into, first, the cold war and, second, the techniques of threatened warfare against states in the third world.

I intend to look at the multiple uses the Soviets have made of the concept of the nation-state as the actor in world politics. This has been an axial point the Soviets have used to unhinge the entire international order built up by liberal European political thought. Soviet thought and practice made for a transnational, or multistate challenge to that order—a challenge whose salience is growing, not diminishing, despite the euphoric tone of some that history and international struggle appear to be over.

Whether the cold war is or is not dead, the global struggle for power, influence,

and resources will continue in changed circumstances. To be sure, the struggle will be conducted by multiple actors, all of whom have in their arsenals not only their own cultural tradition of sanctified conflict but also have the experience of Leninist and other totalitarian modes of political struggle.

In our time the concept of war has taken on attributes that render it no longer a purely military conflict. Conflict is no different from peace, and, indeed, the concepts of peace and war have been turned inside out by foreign dialecticians. Since 1775 every major internal war or revolution has been one in which foreign intervention played or threatened to play the major role as well, leading to an erasure of the formerly delimited boundaries among states.

As Professor Bozeman observes, movements claiming to be states in embryo or liberation movements operating transnationally across recognized borders increasingly challenge the state system. The concept of the state is impaired because it is used promiscuously to cover new types of multinational and multi-confessional political organizations. These are organizations whose leadership, as in the Soviet case until now, has insisted that its boundaries—internal and external—are merely provisional.

Accordingly, as Professor Bozeman states, the concept of international war has also been rendered invalid. It no longer pertains solely to violent interstate conflicts. Rather the term now connotes a broad spectrum of "conflict acts" ranging from sporadic guerrilla strikes to civil wars, wars of liberation, secessionist movements, invasions, insurrections, and so on. Often foreigners are the inspirers, supporters, and occasionally the beneficiaries of these conflicts.

Finally, the erosion of the state as the fundamental form of political organization (along with the acquiescence to, and

coexistence of states with "antistate bodies" as equal actors in world politics) has led to the devaluation of both the world society of sovereign and formerly equal states and the law of nations which stipulates their rights and obligations.

Leninist models of political and arms struggles, including the unhinging of states using the national issue among other things, have become transnational. Generally, the concept of the state is not relevant to non-Western European experience. That includes imperial Russia, which was kind of a Caesaro-Papist regime on to which Western concepts of natural law and enlightened absolutism were grafted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. An example of this tradition is not just the multiconfessional nature of the Russian state from the inception of its abiding imperial vocation. Equally telling is the fact that, until the revolution, Russian public law, with few exceptions, recognized as Great Russians members of any ethnic group that adopted Orthodox Christianity. In short, Russian citizenship denoted a creedal, ideological conception of the state. Those distinctions were eroded by modernizing nationalism in the late nineteenth century, but they were revived in a secularized form by the Bolsheviks.

For Lenin, the Communist party was the "mind, honor, and conscience" for the contemporary world. Thus, all means it sanctioned were ethical because they advanced socialism.

A principal means of advancing socialism was the use of the national question to bring about an unhinging of opposing states and communities whose existence blocked the advance of Soviet Russia. Lenin's attitude about nationality as it pertained to internal and foreign policy was wholly instrumental. In 1915 he quoted Friedrich Engels on the subject: "The whole thing, which is to say the national principle is an absurdity got up

in a popular dress in order to throw dust in shallow people's eyes and to be used as a convenient phase or to be laid aside if the occasion requires it."

Lenin and his followers embraced the idea that self-determination only applied to the proletariat of each nation, which, in turn, was incarnated in and subservient to its indigenous Communist party. It did not apply to the rest of the nation.

This amounted to the denial of the concept of the nation and the substitution for it of a class, or worse yet, of a vanguard party masquerading under the cover of Marxism as the embodiment of that class. Such a concept, and the practice of trying to conduct foreign policy by revolutionary propaganda abroad, ensured that in foreign states or non-Russian communities the center of the struggle for socialism would be national-political cohesion and the legitimacy of the government in question. This had interesting tactical implications.

For example, in Lenin's 1906 work on partisan warfare, he stated

that Marxism asked that the various types of struggle be analyzed within their historical framework. To discuss conflict outside of its historical setting is to misunderstand elementary dialectical materialism. At various junctures of the economic evolution, differing types of struggle may become important and even predominant. As a result of those transformations, secondary and subordinate forms of action may change their significance. To try and answer positively or negatively the question of whether a certain tactic is usable, without at the same time studying the concrete conditions confronting a given moment in time, would mean a complete negation of Marxism.

Two immediate conclusions emerge. First, it is clear that the call for self-determination, the proclamation of one group or another as the authentic bearer of the revolution, was a tactic to be used as circumstances demanded. Second, the significance of that or any other tactic was aimed at retaining in all circumstances a free hand to advance in any direction deemed necessary and possible.

The legendary tactical flexibility of the Soviet regime derives from a concept of conflict as one waged on all fronts and across the board. This meant that Communist parties must make use of every possible tactic and exploit every conceivable rift in the world, including those within bourgeois society between political factions, between bourgeois states themselves, and between imperialist states and the colonies.

This struggle expanded on a worldwide scale. As early as 1915, Lenin called for transforming the First World War into an international civil war. Ever since then the world has experienced just that kind of strife, with episodes of conflict occurring either concurrently in many places or sequentially. These episodes encompass an increasingly wide array of means that has obliterated the distinction between front and rear, war and peace, nation and class. Written in 1949, "Historicus" commented on the Stalinist version.

Support is not confined to the boundaries of one country and the local bourgeoisie must to a considerable degree be isolated internationally while the proletariat receives direct or indirect support from the proletariat of other capitalist countries and from the proletarian state already in existence—the USSR. Hence, a further condition for a successful revolution is that the balance of outside aid for revolution as against potential outside aid for counterrevolution must be sufficiently favorable.

The work outlining the totality of Soviet thinking on war since 1917 would be a gigantic opus; but there are, nevertheless, significant commonalities across time which affect Soviet thinking even today. Trotsky's writings on the revolution of 1905 indicate that he grasped that the center of gravity of the country is the army's and government's morale and will. Here, strikes and incitements to revolutionary activity could neutralize or counter the technological advantages that industrialization offered the state.

Believing in the superiority of class solidarity as a morale builder, Trotsky saw that the success of patriotic indoctrination—or rather antienemy indoctrination of a nationalist sort—was a means of mobilizing the peasants and thus a means of striking at the heart of the modern army's and government's morale.

The political objective in the resort to war is always the fundamental defining characteristic of a war in Soviet terms. Thus the brandishing of the Leninist ideological tactic allows a group or movement to believe that it alone constitutes the real nation fighting for its liberty and self-respect, a condition which habitually can inspire the utmost in sacrifice.

Thus, the purpose of foreign policy and diplomacy as stated by Soviet specialists under Stalin and after was a class one, aimed, not at resolving conflict, but at perpetuating, strengthening, weakening, terminating, exposing, or suppressing these conflicts. The protection of Soviet security entailed a perpetration of conflict everywhere else. Rather than being an instrument for the resolution or adjustment of conflicts, it was a weapon or tactic in a never-ending struggle.

This has evolved into forms of diplomacy that simulate Western norms yet disguise their real intent. Examples of these are systematic employment of lies and extortion especially against the Fascists and Nazi diplomacy during Stalin's time; aggression masquerading as self-defense; peace propaganda employed to deceive the adversary, including so-called friendship treaties for the purpose of subverting the vigilance of the adversary; aggressive plans disguised as a struggle against Bolshevism and the USSR; diplomatic exploitations of internal antagonisms in the camp of the adversary; the exploitation of national differences and conflicts of interest in the camp of the enemy; systematic employment of threats to terrorize the adversary; and the protec-

tion of weak states as a pretext for aggression. Virtually all of these techniques not only involve the effacing of the boundary between war and peace, they also implicate diplomacy as a tool for aggression and demand the ideational overturning of reality as a means of attaining their objective.

By contrast, the main political purpose of the Soviet army, with all of its offensive military-technical and operational doctrine, has been to deter outsiders from invasion and to intimidate them. Even under Brezhnev, when the military arm was most enhanced, Moscow never intervened militarily when it thought this would lead to wider conflict. As English commentator Ken Booth points out, if Moscow were to go to war, it would be the result of accident, miscalculation, or direct necessity, not rational choice; in fact, that has been the case.

Nevertheless, the need for a reliable deterrent capability on the grand scale of conventional nuclear war required competition on all fronts simultaneously. Thus, we have the Soviet state with assets deployed in a permanent war-readiness condition. Donald Hanle in his book on terrorism stresses two major concepts of Soviet war fighting; namely, the correlation of forces concept and the related one of the war of national liberation. Taken together these two concepts illuminate the manner in which national revolutionary tactics could be raised to a global level of stable, long-term, international struggle without major war. Indeed, in many cases, terrorist strikes are substitutes for actions at the operational and strategic levels that are rendered both impossible and unneeded by the revolutions in warfare, media, and the political struggle.

It is worth noting that a resort to terror at home and abroad declined in gross figures after 1953. The Soviet Union expanded its covert means of warfare abroad as much as it did the conventional and strategic military arms, which were

designed to intimidate the West and hold it at bay in various arenas. Then, as now, Soviet analysts proceeded from a class analysis of sovereignty and related issues that turned normal relational phenomena inside out.

The party, of course, given its superior insight into history, necessarily had the exclusive right to revise these phenomena. As Robert Jones observes, Soviet analysts divided sovereignty into both internal and external manifestations. Internally sovereignty meant proletarian supremacy at home; externally it meant independence from capitalism. But in spite of this denigration of sovereignty and substitution of party for class in the state, foreign audiences only received the message that Soviet-type sovereignty was authentic.

The USSR accepts an explicit mandate to wage ideological warfare everywhere but staunchly displays outrage at any such effort directed against it from the outside. Only the Soviets have had the patent to this technique, and as long as they have maintained it, they have succeeded greatly in world affairs.

Khrushchev and Brezhnev both built their policies around the same set of inherent principles concerning the nation and the class as political manifestations. They included also the inevitability of global struggle—if not nuclear war or intersystemic war—and the substantial upgrading of such instruments and techniques as subversion, proxies, intelligence, covert operations, and terrorism.

The proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine as a rationalization for the invasion of Czechoslovakia and its subsequent defense by Gromyko at the United Nations reflected a Soviet effort to graft ideological principles onto established juridical codes of international conduct and transform them into something opposite of what they were. The socialist commonwealth became a distinct, ideological, and political com-

munity that operated under its own dispensation, making it immune from the normal rules of intervention and sovereignty. Socialist states, individually and collectively, have invisible ideological frontiers which may be violated when it is determined that outsiders with equally invisible means transgress against them. Just as Soviet and Fascist doctrines intersected when Soviet ideologists fused class with nation in Stalin's time, so too they began a process of ideological commingling that has continued with the proliferation of third-world states.

For our purposes, the significance of the Brezhnev Doctrine is that it constituted the ideological/political rationale for a policy which married ideology instruments of subversion and direct force in Europe, the United States, and the third world. The aggressive policies of 1967-82 were all undertaken in the name of that doctrine and spawned a search for power abroad in states of socialist orientation, vanguard parties, and the internationalist mission of the Red Army.

Any study of the uses or definitions of the term *peaceful coexistence* under Brezhnev demonstrates a wide understanding in policy-making circles that it pertained only to nuclear and high-intensity theater conventional warfare, not to the advancement abroad of socialism. Moreover, violence was clearly sanctioned as a legitimate instrument for the attainment of Soviet goals.

Within the notion of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet right of intervention abroad to realize proletarian internationalism found its expression in the internationalist and liberating mission of the Soviet armed forces. Released from inhibitions of competing with America for the attainment of parity after our post-Vietnam demoralization, the USSR could, when conditions were favorable, decide a contest such as in Angola, the Horn of Africa, or in Afghanistan.

Lurking behind these assumptions were the fundamental irreconcilability of socialism with the international status quo; the need to devise a total strategy to unhinge the status quo even while using it for maximum advantage; the reliance on political and, ostensibly, nonmilitary factors to militarize world politics and domestic politics everywhere if possible; and the creation of an alternative reality. This re-creation of reality, along imposed ideological lines, can be glimpsed from Soviet President Podgorny's observations in 1977. When surveying the lands of Southern Africa, he said that the boundaries of Zimbabwe and South Africa were not national ones but class boundaries. In other words, the usual confusion of class and nation lay at the bottom of Soviet perceptions.

By April 1980 the Soviet ambassador to Paris, who had served as ambassador to Prague in 1968, stated that any country on the globe has the full right to choose its friends and allies and, if necessary, to repel with their aid the threat of a counterrevolution or foreign intervention. Thus, the Brezhnev regime, towards the end of its life, staked a claim to the universalization of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the concepts of preordained struggle and proletarian internationalism. Taken to its extreme, one could easily foresee a global civil war fought with psychological, political, covert, and small-scale operations characteristic of low-intensity conflicts or of conventional conflicts among superpower proxies; in a word, a universal version of the state of siege introduced by Lenin.

If an insurgent succeeds in tearing apart the fabric of relations upon which a society or a society of states rests, then violence can serve as the midwife of a new order legitimized by military success. Thus, low-intensity conflict applied globally becomes a basis for the raising of this conception of warfare to the global level. If the ultimate goal of such warfare

is the creation of a new social order, we encounter a total war targeted not just against soldiers but against the legitimacy and consensual basis of a society or the international order as a whole. Everyone is somehow drawn into this war, either physically or psychologically.

Despite the critiques of the Brezhnev era and the policies of Gorbachev associated with today's "new thinking," the Soviet mode of operation has only been tuned down in its intensity and frequency. It has not been fundamentally disbanded.

In the eighties, crises due to economic and technological stagnation, arteriosclerosis of the party and state apparatus, the costs of arms and the technological arms race against the United States, and the failure of Soviet strategy in Afghanistan forced Soviet leadership to do a rapid reassessment. This reassessment, the new thinking, was a result of the spreading awareness that not only the USSR's superpower position was endangered, but that its competitive status was, as time ran out, equally at risk.

Gorbachev's policies in many ways are undoubtedly fundamentally different and more concessionary than what came before. Yet the new thinking also lays claim to being a revolutionary departure in policy perspectives. Several strands comprise this fabric of perspectives on international relations that are worth reviewing.

1. Security is mutual, that is, both superpowers' security is interdependent. The actions of one naturally impinge directly upon the other; accordingly, neither can act in isolation from the other.

2. Security cannot be achieved unilaterally by purely military means. Rather, both superpowers must seek to negotiate and achieve political solutions

to the problems on their agendas, from regional conflicts to conventional strategic disarmament.

3. Regional conflicts must be resolved by purely political means which sanctify freedom of choice for the states involved to pursue whatever line of domestic politics they choose. The process by which these conflicts must come to an end has been renamed the "balance of interest." Equally important, arms transfers and foreign intervention in these conflicts must be ruled out. The United Nations and its component agencies can play important roles in this conflict resolution process.

4. All states must enjoy freedom of choice in choosing their form of government free of outside intervention.

5. The processes of conflict resolution and intensified dialogue must be buttressed by an ideology of foreign relations that recognizes the other side's interests as legitimate ones that merit consideration and serious discussion.

6. Finally, the balance of interest should culminate in a system of universal or comprehensive security—including economic security—from foreign intervention. The process should also include joint cooperation, a strengthened United Nations, total nuclear disarmament, and greater authority for international legal agencies.

Much of this is a radical departure from past rhetoric. No longer is class struggle clearly transposed from internal politics of states to nations as in Stalin's case. Also, no longer is the world fatalistically divided into a struggle between two ideological camps.

Soviet military/political commentators agree that the unprecedented threat the USSR faced and the dead-end to which previous policies have led, forced a revision of Soviet political thinking. By

1988 Soviet writers were penning apocalyptic essays stating that the last chance for the USSR to remain a great power, much less a superpower, depended on adaptation of the new spiritual and intellectual perspectives associated with the new thinking, *perestroika*. Today, the signs of a real decline in Soviet international power are evident everywhere and acknowledged—a fact which underlies the concessionary basis of Gorbachev's policy in Europe.

All this sounds good, but there is another shoe to fall. The language of freedom of choice in the new thinking has a Western ring to it. But essentially, it is an effort to get the West to sign on to a principle that is solidly established in Soviet thought about its national interests; namely, that its sovereignty will not be diminished by outside intervention or pressure. Thus, while the USSR desperately seeks Western aid and material assistance, the Soviets still demand freedom to do as they please and deceive the world about their actions in places like Lithuania where they are ostensibly refraining from "use of force."

The techniques of struggle are now turned inward, harnessed to a system whose leader talks in terms of permanent national interest but still believes in the internationalist notions of class. Given the conceptual confusion and short attention span of Western societies, no new consensus on international order is likely to emerge soon. Even the idea of such an order resting on shared East/West values seems quixotic for all the talk and thinking.

Though one chapter is closing in Russian and Soviet approaches to conflict, there is no guarantee that another is not now opening, and its potential, in concert with what is developing in the third world, does not necessarily inspire confidence. If low-intensity conflict is the wave of the future, and since Moscow still supports

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its clients strongly and arms others, gentlemen may cry peace, but there is no peace. There are only intermittent truces

in a long night of rising and ebbing conflict.

An Islamic Concept of Conflict in Its Historical Context

Dr Lewis B. Ware

THE PUNDITS say that *perestroika* has consigned conflict to the dustbin of history. I think, on the contrary, that recent world events have given the lie to this contention. Conflict is very much alive in societies where violence remains both normative and legitimate. The cultural determinants of conflict help explain the protracted, and situational, nature of violence which blurs the distinction between peace and war. In the West, where the nation-state maintains territory and politico-economic sovereignty through international law, culturally conditioned wars represent a very unsettling phenomenon. For in societies where the theory of state is weak and its institutions moribund, neither the political and economic causes of conflict nor the equality of states under international law obtain. Such conflict is waged under a broad spectrum of conditions, in circumstances whose international and domestic interests are unclear, and by insurgents whose ideologies aim at the destruction of the reigning sociopolitical order. In a word, to study war today is perforce to study the culture of conflict.

In her seminal article, "War and the Clash of Ideas," Professor Adda Bozeman has presented these views in a clear and eloquent fashion. That Professor Bozeman foresaw two decades ago today's cultural conflicts accentuates the urgency to refine her analysis and to present it in a context relevant to our military, which will continue to face future low-intensity warfare.

The purpose of my short paper this morning is to analyze the Islamic dimension of cultural conflict, to demonstrate its conformity with Professor Bozeman's thesis, to refine that thesis as an instrument for understanding the varieties of Islamic conflict, and to suggest that the military integrate this knowledge into doctrine and strategy for future low-intensity wars in the Middle East. My paper proposes that a concept of Islamic war is readily discernible in both Sunni and Shi'i law;* that the impact of Islamic and Western history has changed this concept for Muslims; that Islamic war is embedded in a theory of international law diametrically opposed to that of the non-Muslim world; that the political and ideological elaboration of Islamic war reflects an important aspect of contemporary Islamism; and that low-intensity conflict situations in Lebanon and in Egypt best illustrate contemporary Islamic conflict.

The Islamic concept of war is called *jihad*. Jihad is "striving in the way of the one God." In classical Islamic times jihad served to consolidate the early Islamic community or *ummah* around the monotheistic ideal, to give that *ummah* its religio-political legitimacy, and to provide

*The word Sunni refers to the orthodox interpretation of the tradition of the Prophet, or his *sunna*. The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni. Shi'i refers to the partisans of Ali (Shi'at Ali), the fourth successor to the Prophet, and to the tradition in which governance of the community of believers passed from Ali through a line of twelve *imams* or spiritual leaders. Mainstream Shi'ism is almost exclusively Iranian.

a rationale for its expansion through conquest. Jihad reflected, then, the need to defend the *ummah* from error by assuring its right belief and its right practice through individual study. This is called the jihad of the "heart and of the head." It guaranteed an internal state of peace in conformity with the revealed sociomoral order. At the same time, jihad provided an impulse to extend that order through an external state of war, that is, by jihad of the "sword and the hand."

So long as the conditions of Islamic expansionism prevailed, Islam presumed a dynamic relationship of tension between the *dar al-Islam* (the abode of peace) and the *dar al-harb* (the abode of war), of which jihad was the legal instrument of accommodation.* Inasmuch as the Islamic sociomoral order did not apply to the *dar al-harb*, there could be no question of equality between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. Only the possibility of conditional tolerance could prevail. Therefore, peace was spoken of in terms of a truce whose declaration met the demands of historical expediency. Based thus on the morality of law, the Islamic theory of international relations took the individual rather than the state as its primary concern. The classical *dar al-Islam* was borderless, transnational and, for this reason, continually in a state of territorial flux. In the larger sense, jihad was the manifestation of Allah's will to absorb the *dar al-harb* and to prepare it for the recognition of the self-evident superiority of the Islamic religious order. Once this tension was resolved by conversion, jihad would be obviated. If jihad

liberated people from false morality and secured for them religious liberty, then the waging of war was a condition of permanent peace once men recognized that the acceptance of Islam remained the only guarantee of mankind's "right" to avoid sin.

Now, Islam is not an abstract theology; its various historical forms have always conformed to changing circumstances. When the Islamic imperium reached its limits of historical expansion, it fell like most imperia into a state of disequilibrium which fragmented the Muslim religopolitical unity and required Muslims to reexamine the offensive and defensive nature of jihad, its rules of conduct, and the nature of the authority to declare war. Under imperial conditions, jihad was regulated according to a defined code; was declared by the caliph, sole executor of God's design for his *ummah*; presumed a definable enemy; and occurred whenever it was possible to demand the liberation of humanity from unbelief. Classical jihad gave polytheists no choice but to accept Islam or die. Jews and Christians, called the "Peoples of the Book" or "scriptuaries," entered the *ummah* through jihad as protected minorities under the compulsion to pay a head tax. Under imperial conditions, jihad was the collective duty of the *ummah*; therefore, it could be fulfilled by an army rather than as the individual duty of every Muslim. But with the decline of central Muslim power and the rise of the continual skirmishing of Islam with a triumphal Christendom, the operative principle of offensive jihad fell dormant—without, however, losing its permanent character.

In regions of peripheral contact with the *dar al-harb*, peace ensued as a temporary cessation of hostilities within the context of nonrecognition and inequality.

*The *dar al-Islam*, in general, was everywhere Islamic law or sharia held sway. The *dar al-harb* was all territories where other non-Muslim forms of the sociopolitical and moral order predominated, even if these territories had a Muslim population. In common usage this opposition came to denote and to distinguish the Christian West from the Muslim East. It is, nevertheless, a nonterritorial concept.

From this peace evolved what was called an abode of truce, or the *dar al-sulh*,* based on the principle of safe conduct and free passage between Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. Therefore, the formal truce could take the form of treaties, equating to a state of sustained but contingent neutrality. As a consequence, the clear-cut distinction in Islamic law between offensive and defensive jihad was lost. As Majid Khadduri, a pioneering scholar of Islamic law has said, at best jihad now referred to a relationship between the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-harb*, that existed under the threat of constant insurgency.

Formerly jihad had been waged on the frontiers of Islam. From the thirteenth century on, however, internal imperial fragmentation posed the problem of an internal jihad as an instrument to combat dissension, rebellion, apostasy, and secession within the *ummah*. How then could jihad be considered "bellum justum" or "just war"?

With their interest in preserving the religio-political unity of the *ummah*, Sunni jurists understood war among the constituent parts of the Muslim imperium to mean "secular" wars not permitted as jihad. These wars were unjust, and since Muslims could not declare jihad against fellow Muslims these secular wars were thought to result from "social diseases" and not from political negligence. As few jurists believed that war was inherent in man, they called such internal conflicts simply *harb* or "strife," to be avoided as an evil inconsistent with the *sharia*, the Islamic corpus of law. Real dissension in the *ummah* arose from the Muslims' failure to abide by the ideal sociomoral prescriptions of the Koran. That failure was attributed in part to the impingement

of non-Muslim values that penetrated Islam through the *dar al-sulh* where the Muslim order met the non-Muslim world. The answer to the problem was to reform Islam, to strip it of impious non-Muslim accretions, to return it to its pristine state of purity, and to strengthen its fiber so as to show people how to lead a truly Muslim life. Ceasing to be a form of litigation between Islam and the non-Islamic world, jihad turned inward. It became the "greater jihad" of the tongue and of the heart, a form of self-regulation the prophet had proclaimed as the divine struggle; it became an individual duty to "enjoin the good and forbid the evil" as the Koran demanded. Thus, jihad served the evolution of an apologetical literature designed to seal Islam hermetically off from pernicious Western influences by proving once again that the *ummah* was the best society possible and Islam the superior faith. The unbelievers could be resisted only through conscientious restructuring of Muslim society through the jihad of the heart.

In this way jihad fit the circumstances of Muslim decadence. We must not infer from this that jihad had only a conservative side; it could be liberal in the sense that to reject the West, jihad demanded a selective borrowing from Western legal sources so as to adjust traditional values to modern scientific thought. But whether conservative or liberal, the result was always the same. The basis for social development remained religiosity through inward-looking jihad. Thus the normative orientation of Islam toward sociomoral and religious values avoided the real question of the structural conditions that defined Muslim backwardness.

To sum up, jihad came to mean knowledge of the moral good. The *ummah*, the divinely inspired community of salvation, commands the moral good and masters nature through knowledge of moral law. Inasmuch as only the *ummah* can develop and preserve Islam,

*The *dar al-sulh* was a concept in Islamic law by means of which the relationship between the Arabo-Islamic empire, or constituent parts of it, and the various non-Muslim kingdoms, empires, or principalities at its periphery could be regulated without resort to conflict.

the secular state cannot provide the focus for this task. The West imposed the secular state on Islam via the *dar al-sulh* (the abode of truce), as a tool of colonial penetration. From the classical Islamic point of view, the secular state is by definition illegitimate.

If in Sunnism—and I have been talking about a general Sunni point of view—offensive jihad has been suspended because history no longer provides the circumstances for the imperial Islamic state to use it as a modality of expansion, then jihad has also been suspended in Shi'ism because of the absence of an *imam* to declare it. Shi'ite jihad is connected to the doctrine of *walayah* or "obedience to the Hidden Imam," whose authority in matters spiritual and temporal is imminent in the world, yet unseen. When the Hidden Imam reappears on earth, offensive jihad for the Shi'ites will continue.

To the Shi'ite mind, Sunni unbelievers have historically usurped Shi'ite territory. Led by the Hidden Imam, the true believing Shi'ites will be obliged one day to go on offensive jihad against the unbelieving Sunni. The Shi'ites see themselves as the dissenting victims of a historical evil perpetrated on them by the Sunnis. Jihad represents their quest for the justice of their cause. To the Sunnis, dissenters are simply those who oppose the legitimate rulers of the *umma*; but to the Shi'ites, dissenters are those who disobey the injunctions of the Hidden Imam. The Sunni and their non-Muslim confederates among the Jews and Christians must be fought so as to win them for the true faith. Then jihad can be waged against all other non-Muslim unbelievers, meaning the polytheists, after the Jews and Christians (Peoples of the Book) are disposed of.

Socioculturally speaking, classical Shi'ite jihad was suspended to consolidate a community that perceived itself under the constant assault of outsiders.

The suspension of jihad ends with the reanimation of Imamic history, when the Hidden Imam reenters the world scene. This means that socioreligiously speaking, in Shi'i Islam, jihad serves to reintegrate forcibly the disunified Muslim world under the Imamic rule of divine justice when, at the end of days, the Hidden Imam reappears.

In the beginning of the sixteenth century, the creation of a Shi'ite Safavid* empire in Persia put the Shi'ite clergy in the position of representing an official sect. This was an ambiguous situation because the secular Safavid shahs also claimed descent from the Imamic line. As the Safavid empire and its rulership slowly decayed under Russian and British imperial pressures, the clergy wrested from the shahs the right to declare jihad on the grounds that they were the general agents of the Hidden Imam and the sole interpreters of Imamic Shi'ite law. But the jihad they declared was necessarily defensive because its object was to preserve Shi'ite territory from the encroachment of the Western unbelievers and to prevent them and their henchmen, the shahs, from reasserting sociomoral ascendancy over true belief. So contrary to classical Shi'ite theory, jihad, during the Imam's absence, was deemed more praiseworthy than in his presence. Since today the threat to Shi'ite Islam is perceived to come from both internal and external sources, the obligation for jihad falls squarely on the individual true-believing Muslim.

In the name of the preservation of the faith, Shi'ite doctrine has evolved over the past five centuries an extraordinary resilience to the changing circumstances of conflict and to the possibility of rightful protest and revolution. In these circumstances, the declaration of jihad ceased to depend on any one cleric, but

*The Safavids were a Shi'ite dynasty that reestablished a Persian Empire in A.D. 1501 and made Shi'ite Islam its official religion.

devolved on the best-suited to interpret the law as it referred to warfare. Unlike Sunni theory, no time limits were set on its execution. Every believer had to bear its costs. Costs could be coerced when not offered. All treaties preventing jihad could be revoked. No distinction was made between unbelievers and Muslims who resembled them. Cease-fires could be violated. Believers did not necessarily have to outnumber unbelievers in a fight. All stratagems, including surprise, were licit. Thus, with the rise of the militant Iranian clergy, jihad was rejuvenated in mainline Shi'ism and justified as the defense of the community without compromising its historical and dogmatic roots. This was the historical and cultural environment from which Khomeini was to rise.

Under the influence of the West, apologists have attempted to strip jihad of its offensive character and to portray it as a tool of social reform. Liberal Sunni laymen and clergy have used the concept of jihad of the heart to close the gap between the East and the West and to procure for Muslims the benefits of modernization. By demonstrating that no fundamental contradiction actually exists between reason and faith, jihad proclaims the struggle for human improvement. Liberal Muslim politicians of our time, such as the Tunisian Habib Bourguiba, have used the same argument for a secular jihad to deal with the problems of nation building and the consolidation of state political power. On those rare occasions today when jihad takes on an offensive character such as in the recent Iran-Iraq war, it is as a rule, evoked defensively to win back territory in order to protect the community from unbelieving Muslims.

Today, it is not liberal Muslims but the conservative Islamists who make the claim that jihad expresses the protest of

the disinherited against the depredations of the modern Middle Eastern secular state system. This new militancy has taken a variety of forms.

There are the Islamists who wish to retraditionalize their lives so they can live in a more perfect Muslim way. They concentrate on applying Islamic legal prescriptions to their daily activities in accordance with *sharia*, the Islamic corpus of law. Their emphasis is pietistic. The state that impinges on their enterprise is to be avoided, or at best, resisted; but it is not to be considered *ipso facto* illegitimate. Jihad for them is the jihad of the heart, an act of self-purification and a way of defining right from wrong action.

A second group of contemporary Islamists believe that Islam is unrealizable outside a totally Islamicized society. They believe not simply that a reinstatement of the rules, rituals, and intellectual prescriptions should animate people; rather they insist that the state should advance the cause of Islamicization by the exclusive implementation of *sharia* law. Their jihad is of the tongue and of the hand. They are willing to compete as political parties in a democratic system to ensure the transition from impious secularism to a rejuvenated Islamic state. The Egyptian Muslim Brothers, the Tunisian En-Nahda party, and various Moroccan and Algerian Islamist groups are examples.

The third group, however, is the most radical in its concept of jihad. In the Shi'ite world, they are represented by the Lebanese Hizbullah;* in the Sunni world, by the Egyptian Takfir wa Hijra** and the Jihad organization. In the mind of the Egyptian radical Islamists, jihad is a

*The Hizbullah or "party of God" is an organization of Shi'ite militants backed by Iran and desirous of establishing an Islamic republic in Lebanon.

**Takfir wa Hijra or "Expiation and Flight" is the radical Islamist faction in Egypt that was instrumental in providing the ideology for the jihad organization that engineered the assassination of Anwar Sadat.

weapon of liberation to free Muslims from what they call the *Jahiliyyah* (the historical "age of ignorance") before the advent of Islamic revelation. The *Jahiliyyah* is represented by the secular Egyptian state and its president. Jihad against the *Jahiliyyah* is neither a defensive war of the apologists nor a means of inner combat against impurity; it is revolution against Western modernity in the name of the regeneration of society and its return to God's ordinances. Its territory is limitless. It does not recognize the concept of nationalism or the nation-state. The radicals expect jihad to liberate people from acts of domination and oppression. The *Jahiliyyah* that jihad intends to combat is not obviously a historical phenomenon; it implies a reoccurring human condition and thus betrays a pessimism about man while actively and optimistically promoting his betterment. Those who believe feel free to exclude from humanity those who either do not believe or who are ignorant of the true faith.

To accomplish this task, preaching Islam is not sufficient. True believers must comprise a vanguard movement for radical change. The Takfir organization claims that social regeneration demands that they condemn present-day society by withdrawing from it. They constitute a true counterculture, a state within a state. If withdrawal is liberation, the Takfir have attained their goal by denying the historical *ummah*. The classical schools of Islamic law are absolutely valueless to them. Only the Koran and the purged traditions of the Prophet can be verifiable sources of knowledge. For them, public prayer in government mosques, public employment, and education are absolutely forbidden. The Takfir will accumulate power gradually but inexorably. In

the meantime, they live communally, practice endogamous marriage, and wait for the fruits of their labors to materialize.

The Egyptian Jihad organization, on the other hand, refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the state. It vilifies the apostate rulers who are incapable of being resocialized and works to assassinate them. Power must be seized to regenerate society. Hence jihad must be practiced within the community against those who govern by non-Muslim, secular principles. But not wanting to accrue power like Takfir, the Jihad organization mobilizes to seize it. Such is their universal duty. They have elaborated no program for creating an Islamic state. The mere destruction of the *Jahiliyyah* and its minions ushers in the messianic age. The present is illuminated by referring it to the idealized past and to the originating myth of an Islamic golden age. To change history by means of jihad, history must be denied.

In many respects the Lebanese Hizbullah is close to the Egyptian Jihad's view of the moral order, while reflecting at the same time a variant of Khomeini's Shi'ite concept of jihad and international relations. Khomeini was a radical moralist. His view of the universe was Manichaean.* He applied an understanding of divine law to the universe which renders satanic everything that is not divine. Humankind is called upon to work out personally and politically the dichotomy of good and evil. The struggle of morality with immorality requires power and ideology. It is equated with the conflict of East and West, the oppressed against the oppressors, the slaves against

*Manichaeism is an ancient dualistic religious philosophy, originating in Persia, that posits a cosmic conflict between a good realm of light and an evil realm of darkness, the resolution of which lies in following the doctrines of the prophet Mani.

the masters, God against mammon, the divine against the human. Khomeini felt that human beings are not capable of legislating their destiny. The good can only triumph through their practice of right belief. Khomeini's attitude pointed back to the ancient Persian Zoroastrian-Mazdean ethos of a world divided between perfection and imperfection in which the duty of each human being was to combat physically the forces of chaos. In the Zoroastrian ethos, the Lord Ahura Mazda personifies the essence of good. Humankind is free to choose good or evil but will be judged by the choice. The prophet Zarathustra is a savior waiting in the wings and the cosmos is eschatologically organized for the appearance through Zarathustra of Lord Ahura. Khomeini, too, could not tolerate evil. In this process of imminent transfiguration to perfection, his messianic vision had apocalyptic overtones and required prophecy to assure the triumph of good.

Translated into Shi'ite Islamic terms, Islam must enjoin the good and forbid the evil. The Islamic struggle for the good of humanity knows no boundaries and jihad for this truth is the best of conflicts. If justice is a cardinal Shi'ite belief, jihad remains its perfected instrument. But this messianic jihad can only be achieved when the Hidden Imam, the Lord Ahura Mazda of the latter-day Persians, returns to destroy nonbelief and to Islamicize the universe. After the Hidden Imam proclaims the rule of God over the earth, war will be eliminated forever. Meanwhile, progress toward this goal must be implemented. The exportation of the Iranian Islamic revolution serves both to ensure this eschatological process and to act as a harbinger of the messianic age to come. Seen from this perspective, the Iran-Iraq war was to Khomeini a defensive jihad resolvable only by Iraq's capitulation, which would sound the death knell

of polytheism. This perception obviated Khomeini's need to deal with the war within the stricter jurisdiction of Islamic law.

In the context of the principles of Western international laws, defensive war is compatible with jihad since self-defense is always self-defined. But the distinction between offensive and defensive jihad remains unclear at best because the definition of jihad in Islam rests on the moral content of the conflictual act and thus on right belief. So peace is not equality through tolerance. Khomeinist Islamism must rule the world through jihad since only its view of the unity of the godhead implies human freedom, and freedom is humanity's absolute "right." From the point of view of Khomeini's absolute Shi'ite ethos, there can never be an opposing right to disbelief and unfreedom.

Is the exportation of the Islamic revolution a true jihad? The Iranian constitution guarantees the principle of noninterference in the affairs of other Islamic states, except, of course, as self-defense. Khomeini exhorted Muslims to rebel; he exported Islamist revolution through his emissaries as propaganda for Islamic behavior—the jihad of the heart and the hand. The direct political connection between Tehran and Islamist Shi'ite groups elsewhere remains tenuous. Ultimately, it has been up to these groups to answer the questions that affect their circumstantial situations. One such question affecting the Lebanese Hizbullah, which also faces the Egyptian Jihad, is whether jihad encompasses and condones the tactics of subversion, terror, and suicide in the struggles against the Lebanese state and the West.

For example, the war that the Hizbullah declared against the US in 1983 was not considered terrorism but a defensive jihad of Lebanese Muslims against their

enemies. But is suicide as a means of defense justifiable? Just as a person on jihad, the *mujahid*, wins paradise if he dies in open warfare, so he who chooses to die a martyr's death, the *shahid*, is similarly considered to be on jihad. In Shi'ism the martyr occupies the position of an intercessor on the day of judgment. His martyrdom "annihilates" him in God and creates greater fervor. By abnegating himself for the sanctity of God, the martyr exercises jihad as "mission." But Islam abhors suicide. Only as an act of self-defense and not as an act of self-sacrifice has the Hizbullah clergy in Lebanon condoned suicide without, however, resolving the moral ambiguity of the permissibility of the act under the rules of jihad. In the final analysis, suicide has been a practical response, outside the strict confines of law, to extenuating circumstances.

The commentator, Martin Kramer, has pointed out that the difference between dying while killing or after killing falls together in the Western mind. To us this act is simply mental derangement; but to the Shi'ite Muslim, the act—carried out under inspiration—is permissible, if not

justifiable. In this way the mechanism of what Western psychologists call mental disengagement, characteristic of those who commit suicide, does not lead to dehumanization but to the sanctification of death. Legitimacy rests on ends, not means, and is necessary if not always sufficient for the attainment thereof. Such arguments can also be applied to hostage-taking and kidnapping. The looseness and the application of *sharia* law to these instances demonstrates the flexibility of the Shi'ite concept of jihad. Such flexibility foreshadows enormous future consequences in the Muslim world, for it is irrelevant whether Islamists will attack Muslim Sunni or Shi'i government or even an outside actor so long as the attack works for the restoration of the Islamic sociomoral order through jihad.

Having been presented with the possibility of a more violent and radical Islamism in the Middle East, only the totally befuddled optimist can disregard the truth of the old Roman dictum: *si vis pacem, para bellum*—if you wish peace, prepare for war.

Cultural and Historical Influences on Conflict Behavior in Sinic Asia

Dr Lawrence E. Grinter

LEWIS WARE's introduction is eloquent and it relates the Bozeman thesis to the current international disorder. My task is to analyze the influences of culture and history on conflict behavior in Sinic Asia and apply elements of the Bozeman thesis where relevant. Sinic Asia comprises the Chinese and Chinese-influenced countries of East Asia: China, Taiwan, the two Koreas, Japan, Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Singapore. My remarks apply principally to three of these Sinic societies: China, Japan, and Vietnam.

In Professor Bozeman's 1976 *Orbis* article, her comments about East Asia, and in particular China, make a key point about how a peculiar bias has substantially distorted scholarship and writing on Chinese affairs. There exists a profound antimilitary bias in the way some Western and Chinese scholars portray Chinese history. The bias seriously deprecates the actual role of China's military and its influence on Chinese society and Chinese governments.

With respect to ancient China, . . . [and I'm quoting from Professor Bozeman's article now] Westerners have long pleased themselves in imagining a spiritually superior civilization, anchored in Confucianism and Taoism, in which men shunned violence and all things uncouth, if only because their attention was riveted on etiquette, sincerity, civility, humanism, and the search for harmony. Just why such exalted views of Oriental society should have become so fixed in the Western mind may well be a question that only ethno-psychiatrists can answer.*

*Allen B. Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas," *Orbis* 20, no. 1 (Spring 1976): 93.

Why did this bias occur in so many scholars' portrayal of Chinese history and, indeed, the portrayal of Korean and Vietnamese histories—two other major Sinic societies of East Asia? First, the interpretation of Sinic Asian civilization, as Americans generally understand it, comes principally from the writings of the "Harvard school" led by Professors John King Fairbank and Edwin Reischauer. These scholars chose to de-emphasize the role of the military in Sinic societies' history. The Harvard school's interpretation seems to have picked up on and reinforced Chinese scholars' own bias against the military. We know that Chinese bureaucrats and literati had a vested interest in rewriting the calendars of Chinese political-military affairs against the military in order to protect their positions. The Chinese literati downgraded, or completely ignored, the crucial activities of the military in making and breaking every major Chinese dynasty for the last 20 centuries. Professor Bozeman correctly identifies this extraordinary bias.

A second point I wish to make is that Sinic societies have long military traditions—traditions that began 10, 15, even 20 centuries before the industrial revolution hit Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These military traditions preceded United States contact and conflict with the Sinic world. By contrast, the United States is a European-settled country with a much shorter, and largely Jominian, technical military tradition that became reinforced in the American Civil War and the accom-

panying industrial revolution. But Sinic societies had 10 to 20 centuries of experience with warfare, and the interplay of warfare and politics, *before* they industrialized. Not surprisingly Sinic peoples do not usually think about war in Jominian ways. They think more in terms of their strategists' interpretation of Sun Tzu's principles.

Accordingly Sinic cultures acknowledge the often constant interplay of war and politics, rather than their separation. Peace tends not to be the opposite of war for Sinic cultures as it is for North American and North European societies. Peace, for Sinic cultures, often has been little more than the temporary absence of anarchy and turmoil because a current leadership—usually collectivist and usually ruthless—happens to be dominating. Such stability carries its own legitimacy, its own celestial mandate, so to speak. Thus Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, and Korean societies are by tradition collectivist, patriarchal, militarily rooted, and anti-democratic. Not surprisingly, they have seen conflict as routine, war as legitimate, and power and force as the basis of political authority. As Professor Bozeman writes in a broader context,

Evidence is totally missing that recourse to armed force evokes feelings of guilt and self-recrimination among the intellectual elites of non-Western societies, or that the high incidence of organized and unorganized violence induces doubts about the appropriateness of ruling moral or political systems. Indeed, the strife-filled records of the past . . . point to the possibility that conflict and violence may well be accepted in most areas outside the Occidental world as normal incidents of life, legitimate tools of government and foreign-policy-making and morally sanctioned courses of action.⁶

As Mao said: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." This is true whether we are talking about the warring-states period of China's fifth through

third centuries B.C.; dynasties of the Han, Ming, or Yüan eras; Mao Zedong's People's Republic; or Li Peng's Tiananmen Square debacle. This has also been true in Japan where political power clearly rested on armed force, whether in the Kamakura, Ashikaga, or Tokugawa shogunates or, later, in Tojo's fascist state. Indeed, the internal pacification of Japan between the eighth and nineteenth centuries is a long, bloody story of recurrent clan warfare and samurai violence. In Vietnam, dynastic power and collectivist political structures rested on coercion, whether in the Le dynasty, Nguyen Van Thieu's Republic, or Ho Chi Minh's People's Republic. Also in Korea, whether we are speaking of the Three Kingdoms' period, the Yi dynasty, Syngman Rhee's First Republic, Park Chung Hee's Third Republic, or Kim Il Sung's People's Republic, political power depended on the armed forces and the police. Thus, at almost every historic juncture among Sinic societies, political power has depended upon either force or the threat of force.

Point three notes that while force was politically legitimate and prevalent in all Sinic societies, the Chinese, the Japanese, and the Vietnamese have all used force in special ways for their own unique purposes. In brief, the Chinese have been an agricultural and stay-at-home people. Being Sinocentric by definition, they believed the world should come to them. Gradually it did—and, by force of European arms, gradually it pushed them into collapse. But before and after the European intrusions, the Chinese have always had serious border problems and a tendency toward internal anarchy. China borders 12 other countries, so their security instinct (and most often their strategy) has been to use force—after they have tried every other kind of policy—to stabilize their borders, or at least to keep foreigners on a leash, freeing themselves for more important

⁶Bozeman, 65.

internal tasks. Though basically defensive in their approach, the Chinese can be very rough on smaller neighbors like the Vietnamese and the Koreans, who have experienced repeated occupation by Chinese armies, to include those led by renegade Chinese warlords.

By contrast, the Japanese have been a kind of "fringe culture" separated from the mainland by the Tsushima strait. They began as a feudal people organized by family clans which, under incessant warfare, emerged into a broader kind of national militaristic society organized around shogunates. Imbued with martial values and pantheistic, spiritual, and nationalist beliefs (Shinto), the Japanese became a race of people so ethnically cohesive, martial, and assured of themselves that they returned in force to the mainland several times to try to dominate it. Thus came the Korean invasions of the sixteenth century and the colonialism and imperialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which ultimately led to Japan's destruction in World War II. Now, using economics rather than militarism, the Japanese instinct remains, in my view, one of attempting to dominate in their relations with other societies.

Then we have the Vietnamese. Like the Koreans, who also were in China's shadow, the Vietnamese are people who were beaten upon. When free of pressure, however, they turned upon their smaller neighbors or themselves. Fiercely nationalistic but historically vulnerable to the Chinese, the Thais, and briefly the Mongols, the Vietnamese took their lumps and then got even with the Cambodians, the Laotians, and the Chams. When Vietnam was invaded it cost the invaders a great deal, whether they were Chinese, Mongol, French, Japanese, or American. All occupiers eventually left Vietnam—it just was not worth the price to try continually to subdue these people.

The fourth point regards warfare. Have there been distinctive Chinese, Japanese, and Vietnamese styles and techniques of war? Evidence suggests distinctive, yes; but unique, no. However, the purposes for which these societies have gone to war and the emphases they have used in their warfare are interesting.

Since China's foremost external security goal has been boundary maintenance and border stability, the Chinese have paid serious attention to a variety of military and diplomatic techniques to keep their borders secure. The first, and most obvious, and one you can visit today, is a physical technique—the Great Wall. The wall was begun in the fifth century B.C. and was expanded and linked up by succeeding dynasties. The wall shields the Yellow River valley, which is the heart of Han Chinese civilization, from non-Chinese, nomad predators. At least it shielded the valley for a while; predators had ways of getting across the wall, often by killing or bribing the guards.

Also the Chinese have made punitive expeditions into tribal areas to the northwest and the northeast. Chinese colonial outposts and early warning systems launched out into central Asia, as far out as the Silk Road, which allowed contact with Europe. The Chinese also have occupied Korea and northern Vietnam on numerous occasions to stabilize these "tribute areas" and to use their ports for trade with other areas of Asia. In addition the Chinese have used bribes, given financial aid, and held foreign emissaries hostage. When the Chinese could not protect their borders, and barbarians swept in, the foreigners discovered that they had bitten off more than they could chew; the conquerors were greatly outnumbered by their Chinese subjects and ultimately had to cooperate with them to retain power. (For example, when the Mongols overran China in the early thir-

teenth century, all of Chinese civilization ostensibly came under Mongol control; but the Chinese, through their sheer population, geography, and sophistication, withstood very well the impact of the Yüan dynasty.)

In the twentieth century, China's involvements in the Korean and Vietnam wars show how the Chinese continue to emphasize boundary maintenance. Chinese forces occupied northern Korea in late October 1950 after signaling Washington that General MacArthur's forces should not approach the Chinese border. During the Second Indochina War, the Chinese put 50,000 troops into northern Vietnam at the request of their Vietnamese ally. In 1979, some 50,000 Chinese troops went back into northern Vietnam at that time to "teach Hanoi a lesson" (which proved costly to Beijing) about its meddling in Cambodia. Thus China continues its two-millenia tradition of using force for political and territorial purposes.

Turning to the Japanese way of war and approach to violence and coercion, we note that by the eighth century the Japanese had settled into a rough, long-term, internal pacification contest. This homogenization process, with its emphasis on martial values and frequent battles, went on for almost 10 centuries. It produced Japanese warlords and strongmen who would: (1) save the country from a combined Mongol-Chinese-Korean invasion in the late thirteenth century, (2) erect a succession of military dictatorships called shogunates between the twelfth and nineteenth centuries, (3) attempt invasions of Korea in the late sixteenth century, (4) colonize Taiwan in the nineteenth century, and then (5) colonize Korea and Manchuria in the twentieth century, which presaged Japan's aggression in World War II and subsequent total defeat.

While the Japanese, unlike the Chinese, historically did not see them-

selves as the center of the universe, they nevertheless seem to have concluded by the sixteenth century that they were superior to other Asian people including the Chinese. With a strong feudal background, warrior values, and a clear sense of racial and ethnic destiny, the Japanese first returned to the Asian mainland in the sixteenth century to prove their superiority. However, that invasion and later ones ultimately did not pay. Since 1945 they have channeled their energies and their competitiveness into economic/financial pursuits. However, a reading of East Asian history should tell us that 45 years is too short to prove whether a culture has fundamentally changed.

Then there is Vietnam. Unlike the Japanese, the Vietnamese were not protected from mainland Asia's turmoils; and, like the Koreans, the Vietnamese were repeatedly pummeled by foreign armies. Invaded and occupied by the Chinese between the third and fourteenth centuries, they also experienced three Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, were colonized by France in the nineteenth century, and were militarily occupied by China, Japan, France, and the United States in the midtwentieth century. Caught between and often battered by more powerful forces, and prone to descend into their own civil wars when free of outside pressure, the Vietnamese culture reflects attitudes and behavior characteristic of people who have been victimized—hostility, suspicion, xenophobia, and a desire for revenge. Vietnam's way of war also reflects her geography and demography. Invaded by numerous outsiders, the Vietnamese practiced guerrilla warfare as their method of national war. In the fifteenth century the Vietnamese turned south to take on the Chams and the Khmers, dispensed with guerrilla war, and used straightforward conventional tactics (which were used again in 1951, in 1972, and in 1975 against the French and the

Americans). The Vietnamese used armed settlers and colonies of soldiers to overwhelm their rivals while occupying regional capitals and massacring tens of thousands of Chams and Khmers who could not escape. These actions constituted pure territorial, cultural, and ethnic expansionism at their neighbors' expense.

Let me conclude with a fifth point which is really a question. What are the lessons for Western military planners and for academics about how Sinic societies see war and politics? The United States has been involved in four wars in East Asia in the twentieth century: the Philippine insurrection, WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. A fifth experience involved the attempt, under Gen George C. Marshall in the Truman administration, to mediate an end to the Chinese civil war. The United States lost over 4,200 men in the Philippines at the turn of the century. (By contrast Filipino losses in that low-intensity conflict were about 150,000.) We defeated Japan completely. The Korean War was at best a draw. Vietnam was a loss. The Chinese civil war did not end the way Washington wanted.

These experiences should tell Americans that in East Asia, and par-

ticularly in Sinic Asia, culture, society, and ways of war are very different from ours. Sinic societies have viewed the use of force as legitimate, warfare as normal and often protracted, and violence and coercion as acceptable means of statecraft. Conversely, the strong desire that one finds in North American and North European cultures to avoid war and seek quick resolutions of armed conflict has not been the tradition in Sinic Asia—a vast area comprising 35 percent of the world's population. I think US force planners and academics would do well to reflect on these facts. American conduct in Asian conflicts tends to validate for that region Professor Bozeman's conclusion that the challenge of understanding the multifaceted nature of modern warfare, and how it varies by region and by culture, has not been met by the governmental or intellectual elites of the United States. Or, as Michael Howard, the Oxford professor of the history of war, once wrote: "Wars are not tactical exercises writ large. . . . They are . . . conflicts of *societies*, and they can be fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting them" (emphasis mine).*

*Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," *Parameters*, March 1981, 14.

Culture and Conflict in Latin America

Myth or Reality?

Dr Bynum E. Weathers

PROFESSOR ADDA BOZEMAN's thesis focused on those cultural aspects of third-world societies that appear to have a propensity for bringing about war. The erosion of the nation-state system as an organizing norm of society is generic to her thesis inasmuch as war in the West is attributed to political and economic causes associated with the nation-state. According to Professor Bozeman, war in the third world is a "complex of irreconcilable norms" that may erupt from a clash of ideas where differing cultures and civilizations are juxtapositioned. Thus, the key causal factors initiating war under this thesis are neither political instability nor economic underdevelopment, but rather the impact of contrasting cultures with their inherent value systems. For this reason, Professor Bozeman feels the study of war is essentially the study of culture. Furthermore, Professor Bozeman proposes that culture is a better analytical medium than the nation-state because it is more comprehensive, embraces more political forms, and is more enduring despite its limitation in defined political parameters.

Is Professor Bozeman's thesis applicable to Latin America? Before answering this question, it is necessary to examine developments on the Iberian peninsula prior to 1492 to gain an insight into the culture and characteristics of the indigenous population in the New World during the pre-Columbian era; to reflect on the impact of the clash between Iberian and Indian cultures during the

conquest and establishment of the Spanish and Portuguese empires in America; and, finally, to review developments in the Latin American republics following independence and their interactions with the United States. This review seeks to identify cultural determinants that might indicate a propensity for war and to scrutinize the basic premise of Professor Bozeman's thesis that the nature of war is obscure and that a conceptualization of war in terms of its cultural components is needed.

In her seminal article entitled "War and the Clash of Ideas," that appeared in the Spring 1976 issue of *Orbis*, Professor Bozeman derives seven general propositions to support her thesis. Her sixth proposition states:

The fundamental foreign policy-related themes running through the histories of sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia and China, converge on conflict and divisiveness as norm-engendering realities. The evidence shows, in particular, that peace is neither the dominant value nor the norm in foreign relations and that war, far from being perceived as immoral or abnormal, is viewed positively.

It is significant that Latin America is not included in this proposition. The reason for this omission may become understandable as we examine the uniqueness and complexity of this region.

In contrast to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, India, and China, Latin America is a product of Western civilization. The Iberian peninsula was the fountainhead of European culture

brought to the Indies in the fifteenth century. We can better understand the nature and thrust of this cultural transmission by examining events that occurred prior to the discovery and conquest of the Indies.

North African Moslems invaded the Iberians in A.D. 711 and deprived them of the exclusive use of their territory, on a gradually reduced scale, until their expulsion in 1492. During eight centuries of occupation, the inhabitants of the peninsula were the recipients of the rich Eastern and Mediterranean cultures brought over by the Moslems, as well as the contributions these cultures made to science, industry, and agriculture.

However, the military victory gained by Spain and Portugal in the *Reconquista* (reconquest) is most significant. This event, resulting in Portugal's independence and the unification of Spain, prepared the way for the monumental voyages of discovery and the establishment of the Luso-Hispanic (Portuguese-Spanish) empires in America. By the end of the thirteenth century, the Moslems had been driven to the southeastern kingdom of Grenada through the combined efforts of the kings of Castile and Aragon. There they remained until their expulsion in 1492.

The crown and the church achieved national unity by working hand in hand, the cape and the sword alongside the gown. Religious fervor was a vital ingredient of the contest between Christianity and the Islamic faith. The purity of the church was as essential to national unity as the dominance of the royal houses of Castile and Aragon in the secular realm. Fernando de los Ríos, a Latin American cultural expert, has expressed this interdependence most effectively.

Spain was impelled to two kinds of militant action at that momentous period of her history: the one militarist the other spiritual, both com-

bative and eager to conquer; in the former the purposes to conquer power, territory, and riches prevailed, in the latter the prime aim was to win adherence to Christianity. There was an interweaving between the two, a mutual aid that engendered phenomena of social symbiosis of great juridical and political importance. A realization of that permanent interrelation between two organisms, each of which depended for its existence on absorbing a part of the vital juice of the other, is quite fundamental for the understanding of Spanish colonization.

Following the first voyage of Columbus, Pope Alexander VI divided the Indies between Spain and Portugal—this division subsequently was clarified by the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas.*

It is appropriate to examine the impact of the *Reconquista* on certain cultural traits of the Spanish and Portuguese societies. Although situated on the European continent, Spain and Portugal are separated from their continental neighbors by geographical barriers and are in close proximity to North Africa and the Islamic culture. Consequently, both nations developed eclectic cultures within the mainstream of Western civilization. For the most part, they directed their energies toward regaining lost territory, establishing viable political entities, and preserving traditional cultural values. In the process of attaining these goals, Spain and Portugal were compelled to wage war and, as a consequence, experienced a heightened martial spirit.

This martial spirit was likewise reflected in the actions of the Roman Catholic church, which regarded the *Reconquista* as a just war undertaken to protect Christianity from further Islamic contamination. On the religious front, such actions as persecutions, tortures, purges of dissenters, confiscations, ex-

*The dividing line established by the pope was 300 miles (100 leagues) west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, running from pole to pole. When Portugal protested, the line of demarcation was changed to 1,110 miles (370 leagues) west of the islands and placed in the Treaty of Tordesillas. Thus, Brazil was created as a Portuguese colony, but in later years she expanded much farther west.

communications, and burnings at the stake were justified as means to ensure control over the church by the faithful. The heretic always ran the risk of being apprehended and subjected to the Inquisition. The inculcation of religious fervor intensified the Iberian fighting spirit.

The Luso-Hispanic cultural traits were transferred to the New World with the conquest of the Indies and fused with those of the indigenous peoples. In Portuguese America, large numbers of unaffiliated Indian tribes were scattered along the coast from the Amazon River to the Rio de la Plata but no civilization comparable to those in Spanish America had emerged. In Spanish America, three large Indian civilizations confronted the conquistadores (conquerors): the Aztecs, the Incas, and the Mayas.

Within the Aztec civilization, the warrior held a position of great honor and prestige, as would be expected in a society that thrived on warfare and conquest. The religion of the Aztecs centered on human sacrifice, and one of the major objectives of their warfare was the capture of enemy tribesmen for sacrificial purposes. Rewards for the successful warrior included membership in honorific military orders and grants of tribal land. At the time of the arrival of the conquistadores, the Aztec confederation, composed of approximately 30 tributary villages extending from present-day Mexico City to the Gulf of Mexico, was at the height of its power.

Some distance to the south, the Incan civilization had expanded from its base at Cuzco to encompass an area of nearly 350,000 square miles. The success of the Incan Empire may be attributed to its superior military organization and strategy, as well as to the absence of vindictiveness toward the conquered. Captured Indians were taken from their scattered locations and settled in communities where they could be controlled

and imbued with Incan culture. The captive leaders were removed and taken to Cuzco as hostages to be indoctrinated by royal tutors. Incan society was highly stratified and a rigid caste system existed. When the Spaniards arrived, the Incan Empire was on the decline, following its division between two ruling heirs and the eruption of civil war.

The Mayan civilization, the third of the triad, was the most culturally advanced of any Indian society in the New World in the pre-Columbian period. Having roots going back to the pre-Christian era, the Mayas reached their cultural apogee during the Classic Period from A.D. 325 to 925 in the central highlands of Guatemala and present-day Belize, and in the southern Yucatán peninsula. In contrast to the empires of the Aztecs and the Incas, the Mayas were organized in city-states with few political bonds among them. Operating independently, these city-states were ruled by an elite class of nobles and priests. War and conflict were virtually absent from the daily lives of the Mayas and, despite trade rivalries, potential conflictive issues were resolved peacefully.

By the tenth century, however, with the ending of the Classic Period, Mayan society faced a cultural decline which continued until the arrival of the Spanish conquistadores in the early sixteenth century. The Mayan sites in the south were abandoned with the collapse of the city-states; and a new Mayan civilization, dominated by the Toltecs* and indoctrinated in the warrior concept, arose in northern Yucatán. The demise of the Mayan civilization of the Classic Period has yet to be explained. In contrast to the earlier culture, the new Mayan society was characterized by intermittent wars and violence occasioned by the introduction of militarism.

*An ancient Indian civilization of Mexico whose language and culture resembled that of the Aztecs but whose origin was earlier.

By the time the Spanish conquistadores arrived, the warrior concept was well imbedded in the Indian civilizations of Hispanic America. The encounter between these divergent cultures led to conflicts in which the Indians, though numerically larger, were no match for the Spaniards equipped with superior weapons and equipment, and with horses, which were previously unknown in the Indies.

Beginning as early as the voyages of Columbus, the Spaniards adopted a confrontational attitude toward the Indians. Having an aversion to manual labor, the new settlers looked to the Indians for their labor supply on a compulsory basis. Large-scale exploitation and, in a number of cases, extermination of native laborers occurred in the process of subjugating the indigenous population. Exposure to European diseases, overwork in mining operations, and lack of proper food and shelter contributed to sickness and decimation of the Indians. In essence, the conquest of the Indies dispossessed the Indians of their sovereignty and the free use of their territory. The Spaniards violated their freedom of choice in the determination of their way of life and deflected their historical evolution by producing a new ethnic group, the *mezizo* (a mixture of Spaniard and Indian).

From the beginning of their colonizing efforts in the New World, in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon example, the Spanish crown and legal scholars were concerned with resolving several key issues. Did the king have just title to dominion in the Indies? Was the conquest of the Indies a just war? Was the Indian inferior by nature or was he a rational being? Should the Indian be reduced to slavery? These questions gave rise to a number of debates in Spain and in the Indies among theologians and laymen and were the subject of several convocations called by the crown.

In regard to the question of dominion, the crown had no doubt about this right since it was based on the famous papal bulls of Pope Alexander VI,* issued soon after Columbus's first voyage to the New World. With respect to the free-versus-slave status, a crown committee of jurists and theologians pronounced the Indian free by nature, not a candidate for slavery, and not subject to the Inquisition. As to the matter of a just war, the chief crown jurists concluded that while the Indian should not be deprived of his property, generally speaking, the sanctioning of the conquest by the church eradicated preexisting political sovereignties and justified such deprivations.

In order to ensure the conduct of a just war, the chief crown jurist prepared a curious document, known as the *Requerimiento* (requirement), which all Spanish conquistadores were directed to have read to the Indians by a notary before hostilities could begin and to have a notarized certificate of compliance forwarded to the crown within a specified period. The *Requerimiento* was a recitation of biblical history from creation to the donation of Pope Alexander VI. At the conclusion of the recitation, the Indians were given the choice of accepting the *Requerimiento* and acknowledging the supremacy of the pope and the king or engaging in battle with the Spanish forces. The interrelated problems of labor supply for the settlers and the protection of the rights of the Indians continued to plague the crown throughout the colonial period. The original instructions of the 1502 letter placed the Indians under the crown's special protection with provision for severe penalties against those who might restrict their freedom. While compulsory labor was permitted in the royal

*Special apostolic letters issued from the Papacy: 1501 gave the crown all church titles collected in the Indies; 1506 gave the crown the right of patronage over all churches in the Indies.

mines and public works, the Indian was not exempt from the payment of tribute—a requirement for all Spanish subjects in the Indies. Many Indians reacted by fleeing into the interior and isolating themselves from the Spaniards.

The crown responded within a year to the protests of the settlers over the loss of labor, tributes, and candidates for conversion to Christianity. New instructions were issued. And from this point on, the crown vacillated on how to treat the Indian, how to improve relations between the Spaniard and the Indian, and how to get the Indian to work.

The interpretation and execution of the royal orders of 1503 resulted in the emergence of an interesting institution known as the *encomienda* (entrustment), a controversial socioeconomic institution that survived to the end of the colonial period. Originally employed in Spain during the *Reconquista*, the *encomienda* conferred on the *encomendero* (holder and patron) patronage over prescribed Indian villages with the right to receive tribute or labor from the natives. In return, the *encomendero* was required to defend the natives and see to their care, education, and religious instruction. The most serious charge against the *encomendero* was the failure to carry out specific obligations. Another thing about the *encomienda* which made it so unusual was its ability to be passed from one generation to another. If there was no heir, it reverted to the crown. Near the end of the colonial period, more and more of the *encomiendas* were being held by the crown. In practice, the *encomienda* became an instrument of oppression and led to wholesale destruction of Indian populations throughout the Indies.

Throughout the three centuries of the Spanish American empire, the crown emphasized order, stability, and protection of the Indian. The Creole, born in the Indies, engaged in self-aggrandizement, suppression, and exploitation of the In-

dian. The Peninsular—born in Spain, who came as a government or church official—was caught up in the corrupt, colonial environment and, more often than not, helped perpetuate it by either his unwillingness or inability to change it. The Roman Catholic church represented the only cultural institution that provided the common ground on which the Spaniard (Peninsular and Creole), the Indian, and the African could meet. The emergence of the mestizo, the mulatto, and the zambo (the mixture of the Indian and the African) served to diversify the ethnic composition still further and to introduce a new cultural outlook, unique to the Americas and decidedly different from that of Spain. The participation of the church alongside the crown was essential for the conquest to be successful. Also, religious unity coupled with Spanish political uniformity paved the way for the development of the later nation-state systems that emerged following independence.

Of all the social classes in the Spanish American colonial society, the Creoles were the ones who best portrayed incipient nationalism. They were quite open in identifying themselves as Americans rather than Spaniards. Near the end of the colonial period and into the independence era, instead of as Americans, the Creoles were more often identifying themselves as Peruvians or Mexicans, depending on the area in which they lived. A strong, nationalistic feeling grew and carried on into the independence era.

After the achievement of independence in the early nineteenth century, the new Hispanic states began the long, tortuous struggle to establish order and stability in their societies. Brazil's bloodless transition to independence stood in marked contrast to its Spanish neighbors, who were engaged in a bloody conflict that lasted nearly two decades. Under the umbrella of empire, Brazil gained the

backing of the landed aristocracy in return for protecting their economic interests by providing order and security. Pacification was achieved in revolts in Maranhão, Minas Gerais, and São Paulo (1841-42), and the decade-long civil war in Rio Grande do Sul (1835-45). The emperor also won victory in the war with Argentina (1854-59) and the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-70). The most crucial controversy was over slavery, which was abolished in 1888. One year later, the emperor went into exile and the Brazilian republic was proclaimed.

Following independence, the colonial way of life remained largely intact. The Creole aristocracy occupied the positions of importance and responsibility. The Indians and the Africans continued to perform menial tasks and to live on a mere subsistence level. The mestizo was somewhat better off both socially and economically. Even though the new states adopted republican constitutions, such features as factionalism, despotism, and the lack of experience in governmental affairs made a mockery of the republican ideal. Progress was impeded by difficulties on the part of the governments in establishing an orderly political, economic, and social environment.

Political life was dominated by the *caudillo* (strong man) who relied on violence to gain power and governed as if his constituency was a personal fiefdom. Whether military or civilian, the *caudillo* depended on personal loyalties for his tenure of office. With respect to economic life, the change from colonialism to independence had little effect on the status of the lower classes. Although the *encomienda* ceased to exist, the lower classes faced debt-slavery, the absence of landownership, and economic dependency on the *hacendero* (plantation owner) who dominated the rural scene. From the viewpoint of social life, the caste system and the array of special privileges

so prevalent in colonial society survived and were carried over into the national period. Slavery was not abolished in most Latin American republics until after the middle of the nineteenth century. The church hierarchy was in league with the ruling elite, the *hacenderos*, and the military.

In the last half of the nineteenth century, the accelerating industrial revolution in the United States and Europe called for increased supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs from Latin America. This demand had the effect of making political institutions in the region more stable so that production quotas could be met. Capital investments also poured into the area from Western sources. Because of its one-sided nature, however, Latin American economies were subjected to wide fluctuations in the price of commodities on the world market. In addition, foreign corporate control over sectors of the regional economy increased and the profits from these endeavors were monopolized by local and foreign entrepreneurs.

In the first half of the twentieth century, the Latin American republics continued to strive for political stability, economic development, and social justice. The United States and Western Europe served as their models. Two world wars, the Great Depression, and the Pan-American movement had profound effects on the nature and direction of Latin American societies insofar as modernization was concerned. The Mexican Revolution of 1910, the most sweeping social reform movement in the region, sought to remove those aspects of the colonial heritage that impeded the progress and well being of the inhabitants. Large numbers of European immigrants settled in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, forming the nucleus of emerging middle-class sectors. The rising tide

of nationalism throughout the region, coupled with US interventions in the Caribbean and Central America, placed considerable stress on both the letter and the spirit of the Pan-American charter.

The first half of the twentieth century also witnessed the growth and modernization of the Latin American armed forces. German, British, French, and Italian missions were called upon to assist the fledgling military services. With the outbreak of World War II, the United States replaced these missions with its own. Yet, paradoxically the expansion and modernization of the regional force structures did not cause an epidemic of interstate wars. On the contrary, Latin America continued, even up to the present time, to be one of the most peaceful regions of the world. It has the lowest per capita expenditure for military weapons of any other global region. Three of the bloodiest conflicts—the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–70), the War of the Pacific (1879–83), and the Chaco War (1932–35)—were fought either before modernization of the armed forces had begun or before significant inroads had been accomplished. These wars were caused by disputes over territorial claims stemming from the colonial era, as were the skirmishes between Peru and Ecuador (1941), Nicaragua and Costa Rica (1955), and El Salvador and Honduras (1969). The only arms clash with an extracontinental power in Latin America during the twentieth century was the Falkland/Malvinas War, a conflict involving territory claimed by Argentina on the basis of prior Spanish ownership.

For more than four decades following the end of World War II, the cold war provided the setting for an upgrading of the Latin American armed forces. Beginning in the early 1950s, the United States, through military assistance agreements with regional governments, was the predominant supplier of arma-

ments and professional/technical training for the Latin American armed forces. The ratification of the Rio Treaty in 1947^a strengthened the Inter-American system and enhanced the hemispheric defense concept developed during World War II.

As the cold war progressed into the 1960s, the Latin American military expressed the need not only for conventional armaments but for sophisticated weaponry as well. National pride and rivalry were the primary instigators of these feelings rather than basic defense needs. US concern over the Communist threat and the fear that the Latin Americans might turn to alternate suppliers, particularly the Soviet Union and its satellites, were sufficient to keep the arms flowing southward. The success of Fidel Castro in establishing a Communist regime in Latin America and the subsequent shipments of sophisticated military weapons to Cuba by the USSR gave substantial credibility to the regional arms demands. The ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis further underscored the necessity for providing arms to the region.

The 1960s also ushered in a concept of warfare that would continue to rage throughout Latin America right up to the present time—low-intensity conflict (LIC). Spearheaded by Ernesto ("Che") Guevara under the auspices of the Cuban-Soviet linkage, insurgents attempted to overthrow existing governments from within and replace them with Communist regimes. The Kennedy administration sought to provide internal stability throughout the Americas with the launching of the Alliance for Progress. Under the project, internal security in the Latin American republics was bolstered so that socioeconomic reforms could be made. Consequently, heavy emphasis was placed on supplying the military

^aThe Rio Treaty embodied the "one for all, all for one" concept and provided for hemispheric defense against attacks on any American republic from abroad.

forces with counterinsurgency arms to carry out LIC operations. The proliferation of LIC in the 1970s and 1980s caused serious problems throughout the region. One country, Nicaragua, initially capitulated to Marxist-Leninist guerrillas. El Salvador has been engaged in a life or death struggle with the *Farabundo Martí National Liberation* (FMLN) insurgents for over a decade. The *Sendero Luminoso* and *Tupac Amaru* guerrillas have brought Peru virtually to the brink of collapse.

While the military, the large land-owners, and the clergy continue to wield considerable power and authority over Latin American society, their traditional roles have been notably tempered. The military has become more responsive to democratic openings and civilian control of government. Also, they have opted for increased professionalism in the armed forces. Socioeconomic reforms and developmental initiatives have made inroads into alleviating latifundia, minifundia,* and maldistribution of wealth, although much remains to be done. The Roman Catholic church has moved from its close alliance with the elite to a position of preferential concern for the poor under the theology of liberation.

Thus, based on the above analysis, the following conclusions are offered:

1. Instead of an erosion of the nation-state system, the nation-state in Latin America continues to gain strength and is fully an organizing norm of society.

2. In contrast to other third-world regions, Latin America is a product of Western civilization and continues to reflect these values.

3. The incidents of war in Latin America have been few and the view that war is a normal and legitimate activity of the region does not exist or has not existed since the conquest of the Indians in the colonial period.

4. While the pre-Columbian aborigines considered conflict a normal activity, the crown and the Roman Catholic church efforts after the conquest served to suppress and redirect this warrior attribute in the transculturation process.

5. The instigation and direction of low-intensity conflicts and insurgencies in Latin America with few exceptions have been derived from external ideological sources such as Marxist/Leninist or Maoist, rather than from strictly internal initiatives.

6. The premise that cultures in Latin America make war for the promotion of values that are purely cultural in nature cannot be substantiated.

*Latifundia—very large land holdings disproportionate to individual needs; minifundia—the condition whereby land apportionments are too small to be profitable.

Culture and Conflict in Africa's History

The Transition to the Modern Era

Dr Karl P. Magyar

THERE IS NO dearth of literature regarding violent conflicts in Africa today. Whether insurgencies, rebellions, lawlessness, secessionism, military mutinies, coups d'état, or transnational wars, Africa ranks as the most unstable continent. Forty-one percent of crises during the period from 1963 to 1979 occurred in Africa. The great powers were more likely to intervene in Africa than on any other continent. In the 30-year period following 1948, nine African countries ranked among the top 20 in the category of "deaths from political violence"; and that list is headed by Nigeria with nearly two million casualties. The statistical stress is, however, on the numerical evidence, and the gravity of the problem has not been assessed in sociohumanitarian terms.

Many questions concerning Africa's conflicts need to be investigated. For example, were such conflicts endemic features throughout Africa's history? Did the conflicts begin at the time of the initial contact with the Muslims or the European societies? Are Africans more prone towards violent conflicts than other international societies? Can we elicit a unique attitude towards conflict in the psychology of individual Africans? Clearly, to understand conflicts in Africa, we need to go beyond only statistical data and a few speculative attempts to explain them—which to date have offered no widely accepted conclusions about the African situation.

Whether traditional, indigenous, or tribal conflicts, or whether modern-equipped, externally allied, full-scale, transnational wars, Africa's conflicts can be analyzed within the same universal theoretical framework relevant to most societies. Such a scheme develops categories to reflect broad typologies of explanations in the analytic literature. Few would discount the synthesis of a composite perspective of these theories and explanations.

Three categories of explanations attempt to explain Africa's conflict history. In the first category are the "global structuralists." They maintain that violence today—and much of it during the thousand years of contact with, first, the Arab, then European civilizations in Africa—is the result of the coercion exercised by these external invaders. Arabs sought to develop the trade routes along the east coast of Africa and then across the Sahara Desert. The Europeans then penetrated inland from the coasts of West and central Africa. Global structuralists argue that Africa is today the unwitting victim of international financial, ideological, and strategic interests—all of them manipulating African people against each other, regardless of the ensuing wars and social disruptions. Arms, training, and leadership are offered by the external powers, but it is the Africans who do the dying—and who in the end bear the reputation of being aggressive.

The second category of explanations about violence in Africa is that of the "evolutionists." They offer explanations which do not single out Africans as being particularly or inherently prone to violence. All societies that undergo a rapid transition from traditional to modern forms experience the disintegration of their established social institutions, which formerly offered communal security. Africa's transition, however, suffers from a greatly compressed time frame which exacerbates the gravity of such disruptive forces.

Africans are presently in only the initial stages of their consolidative phase—the most volatile and often the most protracted period in the evolution of *all* nations as they advance towards the rank of major powers. In the absence of established internal legitimacy, opposing factions and diffused concentrations of power are fertile ground for external intervention. This retards the nationwide emergency of indigenously equilibrated and legitimate structures. In other words, external intervention only exacerbates the problems and doesn't allow the Africans to develop on their own. Violence will no doubt abate eventually, according to the evolutionists, as Africans evolve towards political legitimacy and socioeconomic viability.

The third category of explanations of violence concerns the "historico-culturalists." They argue that violence in modern Africa is a display of historically based continuous cultural attitudes towards conflict. Such attitudes are ingrained in the psychosocial makeup of the people and, as such, are not easily transcended. Accordingly, Africa's pervasive inclination towards war and violence were well established before contact was made with the outsiders. But the proclivity to inflict damage remains the same. Africans are identified as being particularly violent by those who hold this view.

These are not mutually exclusive categories, as certain dimensions of all three can be incorporated into a synthesized version. The global-structuralist perspective is especially of interest to neo-Marxist analysts who talk about international capitalism and interference by imperialist powers who disrupt the Africans' own tendencies to develop.

Historico-culturalists, on the other hand, represent an analytic position which may be excessively dogmatic in its assertion that the fundamental nature of man doesn't really change, and that evolution is only of technological means, not of psychological foundations. Historico-culturalists make a valuable contribution with their anthropological analyses of Africa's societies that may be difficult to challenge. But they are vulnerable in their transference of such historical characterizations to the modern era. Much of what happened with the European penetration of Latin America parallels the same development in Africa, except that where in Latin America one talks about respect of the nation-state, in Africa this still hasn't transpired nor does it seem to be developing.

Certainly there are many visible elements of traditionalism in Africa manifest throughout that continent today. But these hardly characterize official state policy in all but the few exceptional cases of a Bokassa or Amin or Nguema.

Professor Bozeman's review of the cultural attitudes towards conflict in a global perspective, presents a provocative view of politically and socially induced violence in Africa's history. Within the analytic framework presented in this present study, she offers the best developed case of the historico-culturalist view. There are fundamental differences in the way different societies view conflict, she says, and to misperceive these, we can deduce, is to risk a wrong response.

Professor Bozeman's analysis of Africa's conflict environment touches on numerous aspects of Africa's contemporary attempts at state-building. She questions if we are justified in thinking "that the territorially delimited, independent nation-state is still universally accepted as the core norm of political organization. . . ." For Africans especially, this is a relevant point of inquiry due to the almost totally haphazard construction of such states (if viewed from the perspective of the Africans, as Africa was carved up by Europeans to suit their colonial interests and not the interests of the Africans). Wars such as those in Ethiopia, Angola, and Sudan, today, are between opposing sides within these countries, each of whose cultural differences are as diverse as those of Europe's nations. We may justifiably expect that before the continent stabilizes, the concept of nationality in Africa will undergo severe transformation—in accordance with Professor Bozeman's analysis.

Her characterization of Africa's warfare ranks that continent alongside other societies whose historical militarism has been judged to be particularly well established. War was endemic throughout sub-Saharan Africa, and "it did not elicit moral qualms." In fact, war was "necessary in terms of certain deeply held beliefs." Participation in war ensured group identity with traditional myths, customs, rites, and ancestors. Fighting affirmed man's essence at the cosmic level, which was rent by malevolent forces. Professor Bozeman maintains that in Africa's prevalent tendency towards group identification, "death was not personalized," nor was it "objectified." Society as an institution was perpetuated by continuous struggle for rule among its own internal aspirants, which, in effect, ensured that perpetual conflict in Africa prevailed. Violent conflict was tolerated, if not encouraged, for the acquisition of

cattle, slaves, women, grazing and watering rights, and for vengeance. Professor Bozeman stressed that material gain as the object of war may have been valued, but the fight also had innate value of its own.

Such militarist behavior was exhibited within a unique metaphysical context. And war, she says, was a continuous business; as such, victor and vanquished would be part of a greater alternating rhythm of the universe. Professor Bozeman's book, *Conflict in Africa*, is a lengthy investigation and elaboration of the same theme, and offers more detailed empirical and theoretical bases.

Professor Bozeman offers her contentious observation—which has known its previous adherents as well as detractors—that after independence in Africa had been gained, "the goal of transcending tribalism was indeed the most intractable of the many problems faced by all African governments" and that occidental types of democratic rule and public law would be "fundamentally incompatible with long-established native patterns of transacting politics."

She notes the inherent incompatibility of certain occidental practices with Africa's own traditions. Political succession and relations between rival leaders in modern Africa is not by peaceful means, but is marked by "plots and counterplot, assassination or regicide, abduction, expulsion, or arrest, and . . . changes of regime [that] have usually been brought about by coups d'état." Professor Bozeman observes that today it is difficult "to isolate a military coup from the mutiny, rebellion, movement of secession or liberation, civil war, interracial massacre, or other flights into violence with which it is entangled." Fighting in Africa tends to be "uninhibited, ruthless, and protracted."

Her concluding comments bear emphasis: "Africans," she says, "are more at ease with conflict in its multiple manifes-

tations than their contemporaries in Europe and the United States." Furthermore, Africans view conflict "positively, as a source of major values and as a determining or integrative factor in life. . . ."

Ali A. Mazrui, another scholar of African affairs, ranks as the most notable African writer who presents an historico-culturalist perspective. His analysis is developed in his volume: *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*. Subjects reviewed in that volume include the state, warriors, masculinity and war, cultural roots of aggressive behavior, dance and the warrior tradition, and warriorhood and sex—all of the usual topics in such an examination.

Mazrui observes: "Political scientists were so preoccupied with studying political change that they virtually forgot how to study political continuity"—a very fascinating observation. Mazrui also offers a useful identification of the warrior tradition as:

that sub-system of values and institutionalized expectations which define the military role of the individual in the defense of his society, the martial criteria of adulthood, and the symbolic obligations of manhood in time of political and military stress.

The individual in Africa is ready to sacrifice his life for society, and each household is linked to the wider community. The warrior tradition also links culture and war. A man becomes a man when he kills an opponent. "Armed struggle, dance, romantic courting, betrothal, the right to sire children, and protecting cattle and status in the community, can all become one interrelated subsystem of values. The mere formation of a tribe is sufficient politicization to engender militarization."

Another African writer, Professor G. N. Uzoigwe, develops the notion of the traditional African state as a fusion of state power with the warrior structures. "The warrior, in a traditional society, was a

political animal." He stresses the formation and maintenance of the great kingdoms at the behest of devoted warriors, among which the king himself was "the great warrior, larger than life." Shaka-Zulu, the famous warrior in early nineteenth-century South Africa, epitomized such a chief of a military state.

Socializing the individual into the warrior culture was a well-established tradition—with variations—but recognized throughout most of Africa. In such a social transformation, "communal undertakings were encouraged; individualism was always discouraged"—a very troubling characteristic in Africa to this day. The individual was rigorously socialized into communal conformity, and the community standard concentrated almost exclusively on warrior values.

In general, the state and the military were inseparable, as is convincingly argued by the historico-culturalists. But, it is dangerous to range broadly across such a diverse continent. The choice of one set of examples from Africa may lead to conclusions quite contrary to those of another set being investigated. The mere identification of what is Africa can be a sufficiently contentious geographic exercise as when Ali Mazrui questions if Saudi Arabia could be construed to be part of Africa as well.

However, most analysts can agree on some fundamental, underlying unities of all African cultural values, divine and secular. Professor Janheinz Jahn notes that there exists a coherence of all disciplines; in Africa, God cannot be removed from the secular daily world. And, a Nigerian writer, Adesanya, notes:

Philosophy, theology, politics, social theory, land, law, medicine, psychology, birth and burial, all find themselves logically concatenated in a system so tight that to subtract one item from the whole is to paralyze the structure of the whole.

This unity of Africans' worldview has the effect of reducing the responsibility of an individual's actions as his behavior is inevitably the result of a wider social purpose or alternatively, the product of the surreal causes Professor Bozeman offers.

Africa's indigenous animist religious tendency, according to Ali Mazrui, blurs "the distinction between man and nature, between the living and the dead, between the divine and the human, between the natural and the supernatural." The traditional resort to violence is not a rational act, calculated by an individual to enhance a personal advantage, as it is in our society. The individual derived status, existential relevance, and personal legitimacy from the collective fortunes of society—including those who have gone before and those who are yet to follow.

But, much as we will be mistaken to overemphasize the impermeability of Africa's traditional culture, we must safeguard that we do not make rash assumptions regarding modern Africa's total rejection of the past and unquestioned adoption of foreign systems of thought. What we will encounter is a synthesis whose evolutionary direction points to an elite-fed modernization tendency which uses—and at times capitalizes on—the vestiges of traditional exuberance for martial activities. There are a lot of examples of this if we go back to the 1960s, the early independence period, with the Congo rebellion, and Rwanda and Burundi. This is manifest also in South Africa today, especially in Buthelezi's Inkatha movement in Natal. He is about as modern as you can be, the most astute black politician in South Africa. But he utilizes traditional Zulu values and beliefs in order to mobilize his masses against the United Democratic Front and the African National Congress (ANC) alliance. Also, in Uganda and Mozambique, the conflicts deteriorated,

were not resolved, and became protracted; hence some of these traditional forces reemerged once again.

Modern African institutions often demonstrate their finite limitations and their inability to exert effective controls over the state. This naturally results in a reversion to parochialism as it can more likely offer immediate security to a specific community than can the distant and ineffective symbols and the paltry efforts of the national state. So we can understand why Africans do revert to subnational units for their identification.

Professor Bozeman's elucidation of the African *Weltanschauung* is superbly portrayed and should inform all interpreters of Africa's conflict history. However, at the modern global systemic level, Africa's conflicts must be viewed within historical parameters that may shed light on the alternative global-structuralist and evolutionist perspectives.

As Africans wage full-scale transnational wars among themselves, utilizing modern arms and battlefield tactics, we need to go beyond only traditional explanations for violence in this new environmental context. At the microlevel, an individual warrior may still perceive his mission within a mythical worldview derived from ancestral cultural values and attitudes towards conflict. But at the macrolevel, we may be faced with the probability that such traditional characteristics may not be sufficient bases for explanations of vital strategic responses today.

Conflict in Africa's history responded to evolving environmental circumstances as that continent was penetrated by external forces. Academic analyses that compare the development of societies through certain identifiable and pervasive patterns, present an "evolutionist" perspective that is very persuasive.

Professor Monte Palmer, one such analyst, offers a useful characterization

in that he presents the traditional phase and the modern phase. In between is what he terms the transitional phase. Presently, most of Africa is in this transitional period.

Traditional societies are marked universally by a number of characteristics. Palmer describes them as affective because they view others in emotional terms, colored by personal values. They are self-oriented—social compliance is out of fear of punishment. They tend to be particularistic. Status accrues via ascription rather than achievement, and relations among individuals are regulated by norms and not by codified laws.

Modern societies, by contrast, are the more advanced industrial societies. They are marked by being effectively neutral, collectively oriented, having greater social universalism, and by being achievement- and competition-based. Social obligations are marked by specific legal and contractual terms. These are broad characteristics, although at the specific society level, Palmer concedes that "vestiges of traditional behavior are clearly evident in economically advanced societies as well. . . ."

For an evolutionary perspective, Africa's history may be divided into five periods that analyze the changing nature of purposes of conflict. We may look at Africa's history before the Europeans came, during the European penetration, and when the Europeans finally left.

Professor Ali Mazrui refers to Africa as a "cradle of civilization"—a historical reference alluded to by many writers of African history. There did exist an isolated African culture at one time, but Africa today is a synthesized entity, the product of that ancient heritage of Islamic culture and Western influence. As of today, substantial areas of Africa have been penetrated for 12 centuries. Unfortunately, there remains very little reliable

historical evidence of social relations, political systems, economic activities, relations among the various tribes, and such that which would inform the student of Africa's preforeign-influenced conflict culture.

The next period is that of European exploration and trade, which began with the Portuguese discoveries of West Africa in the middle of the 1400s. Within five decades, they had sailed as far as the Congo River in central Africa. Professor M. Kwamena-Poh notes: "Until the nineteenth century, Europeans were the masters on water, but Africans remained the masters on land." Whereas the Africans traded for a variety of European products, Birmingham, England, was soon producing 100,000 guns a year for sale in West Africa alone. This penetration of Africa by the Europeans, although purely commercial in origin, introduced both foreign cultural contacts and technologically superior military weaponry, and foreign fighting tactics.

The availability of guns plunged Africa into a vortex of requiring guns in order to supply more slaves—which, in turn, would be sold for more guns. New purposes for fighting, as well as new means, were introduced. Guns could also be acquired from the Arab traders, and Arabs were the source of horses—which accounted for the Yoruban Oyo state cavalry's defeat of several surrounding states, as well as Dahomey, itself a great warrior kingdom, in the late eighteenth century.

At this stage, Africa's traditional culture of conflict was rapidly adapting to a new environment which saw traditional African social systems greatly disrupted by the introduction of foreign military weapons, fighting tactics, and commercial interests. In most cases, Africans were quick to adapt the availability of Europe's technological weaponry in pursuit of traditional objectives but also in

pursuit of modern economic requirements. Both foreigners and natives used each other in pursuit of their varied and respective objectives.

In the European colonization period, Africans still pursued predominance over their traditional African enemies; Muslims still sought to expand commercially, to homestead, to pacify warring tribes, and to save Christian souls.

Of Africa's three cultural components—the traditional Africa, the Muslim/Arabic, and the West European Christian influences—that of Europe was by far the most problematic as well as the most influential. Governmental intervention would enhance private interests. The Europeans perfected slavery as a commercial enterprise—after which it was actively curtailed. European armies would take African lives, after which missionaries came in to save African souls. Traders introduced guns in vast quantities against which colonial administrations then launched wars to halt the Africans' use of these guns. The Africans were confused, but ironically they were the ones accused of being backward, primitive, and aggressive.

The popular image of Africa's colonization episode fails to portray the almost universal pattern of resistance to Europe's process of subjugation. Traditional warrior structures, especially West Africa's well-established tribal kingdoms, actively resisted during the subjugation period. Their armies were at times large in number, formidable, equipped with European weapons and cavalry, and often configured in a professional style often copied from the French. Europeans lost several major engagements such as the British encounters with the Asante and the battle of Isandhlwana, against the Zulus in 1879—one of the worst defeats the British ever had overseas.

Inevitably, Europe's superior military weapons, technology, training, battlefield tactics, and—of course—notorious

Maxim guns, would avenge the Europeans, though African warriors had defeated them initially. Africans resisted Europeans for the very rational reasons of resisting the imposed forced-labor system, slavery, hut taxes, and displacement from their lands. By our standards today, Africa's resistance to this infringement of their rights to self-determination was certainly a more rational act than was Europe's acquisition of the far-flung empires for the sake of dubious glory in the first place.

In the modern independence period, Africans organized to oppose continued colonial subjugation with its ambiguous goals but ruthless exploitative means. That the Africans resisted should not be surprising. Americans, after all, had set the precedent almost two centuries earlier in their war for independence.

We are popularly less aware of Africa's major export in this century: its men, who would fight as soldiers in distant battles in Europe and the Far East. Professors B. Catchpole and I. A. Akinjobin list, for example, 160,000 West African soldiers as having been sent to fight in Europe during World War I, with other West Africans being used militarily in other parts of Africa. Ruth First, another analyst, noted that the French had used Senegalese troops throughout the nineteenth century in the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, in Madagascar, and, also, in Mexico. Four-fifths of the troops killed in the French subjugation of central Africa were African troops fighting for Europeans. Fifteen thousand African troops fought in the French Indochina war, with other Africans having been used at Dien Bien Phu, Suez, as well as in Algeria. Several hundred thousand Africans fought for the British as far afield as Burma and Europe.

With Africans becoming cosmopolitan by exposure to Europe's battlegrounds and universities, it was only a matter of time before Europe's devastated war

economies ran headlong into Africa's political ambitions. The British had encountered the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya in the early 1950s, which did exhibit some characteristics of traditional African ritualistic war. But the purpose of the rebellion was to gain back the lands the British colonial settlers had taken away from the Africans—a modern reason for fighting. Nevertheless, it was the Portuguese who were to encounter the greatest independence wars with Africans equipped with a full arsenal of modern weapons, guerrilla tactics, allies, and Marxist ideology, all of external origins.

Finally, Africa's latest period, the post-independence period, came rapidly once Ghana was set free in 1957. The formative days had been well-spent on developing the intellectual foundations for self-determination, but their final translation into reality soon demonstrated that Africans, once again, had adapted rapidly. Liberation forces, such as those in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and in South-West Africa, were constituted along modern guerrilla structures, reflecting Asian and Latin American influences and not traditional African warrior structures.

Tribalism, today, is almost always officially suppressed wherever it emerges. At the leadership level, for example, revolutionary ideology did not officially tolerate any ethnic divisions; and most movements worked to overcome such potential natural divisiveness where it might occur. *Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Mocambique* (FRELIMO) in Mozambique, South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in South-West Africa, and the ANC in South Africa are all prime examples of this.

The present independence period of Africa is characterized by sociopolitical consolidation. This is usually a very protracted period in which an indigenously derived equilibrated power

distribution emerges slowly—unless interfered with by external powers, which happens to be the case in Africa.

As the state faced the dual threats of internal violence and economic deterioration, central authority gave way to parochialist identities. The results were the urban-rural split in Africa, center-periphery divisions, the emergence of dualistic economic structures, the introduction of external allied interests by ideologically opposing forces, and the disintegration of nationwide political authority. The objectives of conflicts were always unequivocal: the seizure of power of the modern political institutions—not the intent to reimpose an old, traditional, historical system.

Recalling Monte Palmer's analytic model of societies in evolution, his description of traditional society is an apt paradigm of the social culture on which the historico-culturalists focus. External contacts advance these societies into Palmer's transitional phase. Independence only introduces these fledgling countries to the early stages of the consolidative phase, which for many countries proves to be a period of insurmountable and incessant, internal conflicts.

We cannot take issue with the historico-culturalists in their descriptions of the structure of traditional conflict and war. However, in the subsequent phases, they may have greatly underestimated the influence of external ideas, weapons, military forces, education, economic interests, and political interference, which have totally and permanently changed Africa's traditional conceptions of conflict. The atavistic underlying psychosocial belief system of the individual warrior may occasionally reflect in good part traditional values; but the organized military effort, whether those of the conventional armies of today's states or of their insurgent enemies, is best understood within a

modern global context. This may even be more so the case for Africans than for South and Southeast Asians or the Middle Easterners as they have not experienced the great disruption and extensive penetration of their traditional societies in such a compressed time frame.

As modern African governments fail to answer the demands for security, while meeting political and economic challenges, the greatly deteriorating conflict environment facilitates the reemergence of residual atavistic forces, as in Uganda, equatorial Guinea, or the central African empire. But those aberrations hardly describe the fully modern conflict context as those exhibited in Nigeria's civil war, Angola, Chad, or Ethiopia. In fact, if we consider the great degree of ethnic fragmentation, artificial boundaries, numbers of countries, and the generally poor state of Africa's economies, we can just as easily be struck by the relative paucity of violent conflict on the African continent.

This is especially the case in West Africa where the population density and ethnic fragmentation and history of traditional warrior kingdoms is by far the highest; yet, it is generally the most peaceful of all regions in Africa.

Professor Adda Bozeman has certainly made a major contribution to the analysis of Africa's conflict history. Her historico-culturalist perspective offers a provocative view not sufficiently appreciated by students of Africa's contemporary conflicts. However, much of Africa's personality during the last thousand years was shaped by external factors and their influence cannot be ignored. Also, Africa's evolutionary history will be greatly informed by a comparison with other societies in transition to modernity. Such a broader perspective may offer not only a more comprehensive explanation of Africa's contemporary raging conflicts but may also point to a ray of optimism for the eventual cessation of these conflicts.

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